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Summary: This article offers an insight into the present politics of memory practices in the in-
ternationally unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The article offers a historical 
introduction for the purpose to better understand the ethnical conflict and division which char-
acterizes the second half of 20th century on Cyprus. The analysis then focuses on the politics of 
memory practices, some places of memory and the status of cultural heritage in the unrecog-
nized Turkish entity.
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INTRODUCTION
Cyprus is a Mediterranean island which is mostly popular as a tourist destination, but 
also infamous for its longstanding ethnical conflict and division among Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots. Most of the visitors can’t escape getting acquainted with this conflict, and sometimes 
being persuaded to sympathize with one side, be it the Greek or Turkish part of the island they 
visit. Traveling across the island makes an unusual modern-day experience since the southern 
Greek part, Republic of Cyprus, and the northern part, a self-declared political entity called 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (further in text: TRNC), are divided by the UN’s buffer 
zone – the Green line. A compromise solution on the Cyprus dispute has failed to be achieved 
for decades, leaving the island and its residents in a continuous status quo. 
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This article consists of a few major thematic areas. Firstly, a historical introduction pres-
ents the important facts which are necessary to understand how the present politics of memory, 
along with the usage of historical narrative by conflicted sides, gradually developed over time. 
Secondly, the practical aspects of the present politics of memory in the TRNC are analyzed, 
starting with nationalistic symbols, places which highlight these symbols, then describing all 
the relevant elements visible through military presence in the TRNC, and ending the analysis 
with a review of the cultural heritage’s condition. Finally, the TRNC politics of memory is sum-
marized in the conclusion.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
 Cyprus has been an attractive piece of land in the Mediterranean for centuries. This is 
still visible today in the island’s division, since besides Greece and Turkey, Great Britain also 
never gave up her interest in the Eastern Mediterranean region by keeping two military bases on 
Cyprus for herself. In the past however, Cyprus was ruled by the Hittite Empire, Greek colonial 
settlers, Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians, Alexander the Great, the Roman Empire, the Arabs, 
Byzantines, French Lusignan dynasty, the Venetian Republic, and then by the Ottoman Empire. 
The name of the island itself (Kypros on Greek, leading to the Latin noun cuprum) explains 
why it was so attractive in the past: Cyprus was known for its big copper resources and trad-
ing settlements. The other reason is, of course, its geographically strategic location. The British 
Empire took advantage of a sensitive historical period when the Ottoman Empire became weak 
and decadent, to annex Cyprus during the Berlin congress in 1878. They needed the island, so 
they could easily supervise the Levant region. This historical point however, besides achieving 
certain Britain’s strategic interests in this part of the world, also marks the moment in which the 
seed of animosities is planted among the Cypriot population. 
 When Cyprus became an Ottoman land possession in 1571, this was achieved in a rather 
traditional historical way, ‘traditional’ in means of a conquest, a siege, or warfare. Since history 
recording began, it was a common occurrence to witness pieces of land, or even whole regions 
and provinces being taken away by a foreign ruler’s army and remaining as a part of another 
political entity. Even when a change like this caused dissatisfaction at first, if the land was ruled 
by a new political entity for long enough, the residents would adopt new cultures and languages, 
and consequently assimilate. In the past, people were used to gaining new neighbors by warfare, 
and this especially applies on a place like Cyprus, which faced constant changes of foreign rule 
in its long history. This explains why extreme animosities among Greek and Turkish Cypriots 
didn’t begin right after the Ottoman conquest of the island, but after the concept of nations 
and nationalism had developed in the 19th century, and the British colonial rule was established 
(1878). Greek and Turkish Cypriots peacefully coexisted in mixed villages, distinguishing them-
selves by religion (Orthodox Christian or Islam) for three centuries. It is also important to note 
that whenever the Ottomans gained new territories through conquest, they would allow pre-
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viously present religious communities to continue their practices on the condition they would 
pay taxes, what is known as their millet system. The communities would still often choose con-
verting to Islam, since it would enable them to pay cheaper taxes and apply for state functions. 
Understanding this system offers an insight on how Greek and Turkish Cypriots managed to 
coexist in the described way.
 As the Greeks became more nationally conscious during the first half of the 19th century, 
they decided to gain their independence from the Ottoman Empire through war. The Greek 
War for Independence began in 1821 and ended in 1829. The Greeks received support from the 
British Empire in this process, partially because they were appreciated for being an antique civi-
lization and the successors of the thousand-year lasting Byzantine Empire (opposing to the con-
quering Ottomans who symbolized backwardness and corruption), but the real reason laid in 
the British political interests in this region. These a decade long series of events make the origins 
of the friendly Greek-British relations and the Greek-Turkish animosity, which lead to hatred 
among the two neighboring nations during the Greek-Turkish War in the 1920ies. Beside wars, 
what really charged the Cypriot atmosphere were the methods which the British Crown used to 
prevent a possible act of rebellion in their important colony. Whenever signs of potential situa-
tions which could lead to Cypriot independence occurred, the British authorities would use one 
ethnic group against the other to transfer the focus from the bigger picture to the local ethnical 
conflict. For instance, if the Greek Cypriots decided to organize demonstrations, the authorities 
would send Turkish Cypriot police officers to confront the protesting crowd, and vice versa. If it 
happened that someone got killed in the protests, be it a Greek killed by a Turkish police officer, 
or a Turk killed by a Greek police officer, it would create a tense, revengeful atmosphere. By the 
time these incidents turned into regular occurrences, both Greek and Turkish Cypriots had 
evolved from coexisting and declaring themselves through religion, to identifying with their 
mainland nationalities and distancing from each other. Greek Cypriots were being supported 
by mainland Greeks, and Turkish Cypriots by mainland Turks – the newly founded modern 
Republic of Turkey led by the strong nationalistic ideology of the first president Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk. Hence whenever a local conflict on Cyprus would arise, it would part people more, 
and leave a new portion of mutual resentment. This would also affect raising new generations 
of children, since they were being taught that the opposite side was the bad side, and that their 
first neighbors were a cause of trouble. Even though the island itself is big, it became too small 
for both ethnicities to share.
In the middle of the 20th century it two opposing solution ideas for the Cyprus tensions 
occured. The idea of uniting Cyprus with Greece was called enosis and it was based on the ide-
ology known in historiography as the Megali Idea, which was irredentist and nationalist in its 
core and stated that all historically Greek areas and regions which belonged to Greece in the 
ancient period should be established as a Greek state. One of the most famous advocates of eno-
sis on Cyprus was Makarios III., the Archbishop of the Cypriot Orthodox church from 1950 to 
1977, and the first president of Cyprus. On the other side, the idea of parting the island to Greek 
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and Turkish portions which was named taksim, developed later in the fifties (1957) and was 
advocated by Fazil Küçük, a Turkish Cypriot leader and vice-president. Greek Cypriots often 
protested with the intention of achieving their enosis, which often caused a lot of violence and 
casualties. Not reaching much success, they began to use more radical solutions. When Cyprus 
gained independence from Britain in 1960, the violence continued, this time targeting Turkish 
Cypriots who were living in isolated enclaves and were exposed to abuse by Greeks. The reason 
for this abuse can be found in the purpose and hope of creating an ethnically homogenous 
Greek Cypriot community, which could then join their mother country through enosis, without 
the Turkish inhabitants staining it.
There were numerous unsuccessful attempts of calming down the national conflict 
through diplomacy and dialogue. However, looking at the bigger picture, the Cyprus dispute 
was a problem which occurred in the middle of the Cold War, and as much as both Greek 
and Turkish Cypriots wanted to gain more international attention for solving their ethnical 
conflict in favor of each side, the reality was that none of the big political forces had the will to 
solve the conflict. To them, the Cyprus conflict was just a small fish in the sea of entire world 
being threatened by the possibility of nuclear warfare. Even president Lyndon Johnson rudely 
responded to a Greek ambassador in 1964 telling him that Greece is a fly, Cyprus is a fly, and if 
these two flies continue to bother the American elephant, they are not going to have a good time. 
Having seen that nothing will solve their problems besides their own actions, in July 1974 the 
Greek Cypriots organized a military coup with the aim to unite with Greece, to which Turkey 
responded in just a matter of days by organizing an invasion in the north part of the island so 
they could protect their fellow Cypriots from further violence. Ethnical violence was repeated, 
causing many Greek and Turkish Cypriot refugees migrating through the island.
After the Turkish army took over the north part of Cyprus and ceasefire was negoti-
ated, the UN’s Buffer zone was established at the borderline which the Turkish forces reached 
during the invasion. This buffer zone, otherwise known as the Green Line, kept the same shape 
of the borderline from 1974 until today. The territory which remained under Turkish occupa-
tion became a unilaterally self-declared Turkish state in 1983 and continued to administer the 
northern part of the island as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Since then, four decades 
have passed in attempts of coming to a potential solution to the dispute. The self- proclaimed 
TRNC continued to develop in reliance to Turkey, but it is not considered an official state in the 
international community. Republic of Cyprus, which encompasses the southern two thirds of 
the island, joined the European Union in 2004, officially joining as the whole island even though 
EU administration can’t apply on the northern part until the Cyprus dispute is finally solved. 
The brightest point of these decades is probably the 2004 Annan plan for Cyprus, however, it 
also turned out to be unsuccessful since the Greek Cypriots voted against it – opposing the 
Turkish Cypriots who voted positively for it, and Great Britain and the US who supported it. 
Cyprus residents still live divided and seem to accept the circumstances, not actively engaging 
into searching new peace proposals. They continue their conflict through harsh words, even 
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throughout social networks, internet, and tourism. 
As it is about to be shown, this also transfers into politics of memory on both sides of the 
island. The analysis in this article sets from Pierre Nora’s theoretical stand on the functionality 
of dominating places of memory. Nora describes these as places of triumphs, imposing places 
which are mostly forced upon through a top-down approach from authorities and are often 
characterized as cold and official. The author of this article considers the politics of memory in 
the TRNC as a good example of using dominating places of memory for political purposes. The 
used methodology encompasses firstly collecting the photographic materials, experiences and 
impressions after direct contact with places of memory and cultural heritage in the northern 
part of Cyprus, and secondly, analyzing and reflecting on them, in hope of presenting the results 
in a neutral manner.
ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT POLITICS OF MEMORY
Both Greek and Turkish conflict sides strongly politicize the historical narrative with 
the purpose of trying to solve the Cyprus dispute in favor of their mother countries. Strong us-
age of politics of history also transfers to memory culture, and results with strongly developed 
nationalism on both sides of the island. For a neutral observer, the two contradictory narratives 
make it very hard to determine who speaks the truth. The Cyprus case in fact shows two con-
flicted sides bending the truth with the aim of achieving their nationalistic goals, which can 
especially be noticed when studying their history textbooks. The interpretation of the second 
half of the 20th century is post-conflict: what the Turkish side views as heroic actions, the Greek 
side views as aggression, and vice versa. Viewing it like that, both sides rely on their mother 
countries for approving these interpretations, which are then presented in the international 
community, hence causing the prolongation of the Cyprus status-quo. 
 As noted before, the rise of Turkish national conscience began with Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk’s presidential rule. President Atatürk himself, even though creditable and remembered 
for transforming the Turks into a modern, western oriented nation, is not in fact an important 
person for the Cyprus dispute. He died 10th of November 1938, before the outbreak of World 
War II., decades ago before the Cyprus crisis culminated in the seventies. His portrait is the 
most common noticeable motive in whole Northern Cyprus. This occurrence mirrors from 
mainland Turkey where Atatürk’s picture presence took the form of respectful tradition, ap-
pearing from institutions to common places. Atatürk’s picture and bronze statues, along with 
the paired presence of a Turkish flag with a Northern Cyprus political entity flag, make the most 
common ethnic symbols present in the TRNC entity. Atatürk’s persona and the paired flags are 
the most important instruments of identifying Turkish Cypriots with mainland Turks. If the 
self-declared TRNC entity was strong enough to politically represent itself alone, the needed us-
age of a Turkish flag next to their own probably wouldn’t be so necessary. Since the internation-
al community and European Union don’t recognize the TRNC as a country, in that way only 
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recognized by Turkey to which it is completely dependent for political and economic support, 
it is understandable why the paired use of flags is so emphasized. Some examples of this flag 
overusing include them being installed on streets, roundabouts, common parking lots, being 
sold as various souvenirs, or postcards. The most ‘famous’ flags are painted on the back slope of 
the Kyrenia mountain range, directly facing the divided city of Nicosia. Greek residents of Nic-
osia view it as a direct provocation, while the Turkish residents view it as a supporting sign. The 
flags are provocative because of their design and message: one is a red and white colored TRNC 
entity flag, while the other next to it proclaims a crescent moon with a short sentence in Turkish 
underneath: Ne mutlu Türküm diyene (meaning: Happy is the one who declares himself a Turk). 
A more detailed observation of this uncommon political instrument reveals that a lot of main-
tenance is needed to it, starting from controlling the vegetation growth so it doesn’t cover the 
colors and renewing the paint, to illuminating it during night. From this observation and com-
paring it to the condition some older cultural goods in the northern part of Cyprus are found, 
it can possibly be concluded how the unrecognized entity dedicates more finances for ensuring 
the desired politics of memory and emphasizing national symbols, rather than investing in the 
better preservation and presentation of cultural heritage which could enable a better developed 
touristic strategy.
Another important characteristic of the TRNC entity is military presence. The Turkish 
military troops which are stationed in North Cyprus number around 40,000 soldiers. Consid-
ering that just one third of the island makes up the TRNC, this number may seem large at first, 
but when the amount of closed military areas and training grounds is counted in, this number 
doesn’t surprise. Foreign visitors can feel the military presence in Northern Cyprus by noticing 
the barbed wire on fences along the roads, no camera use or no trespassing warnings on the 
city streets, restricted area panels, occasionally seeing soldiers and military vehicles driving in 
tows, and notice guardhouses where policemen are on duty in neighborhoods. Turkish locals 
seem to feel indifferent and used to this aspect of military presence. One of the consequences 
of this presence is the very low crime rate, reaching only 17% of the European average, which is 
why Cyprus in general is rated as one of the safer places in the world. Even though that might 
be considered positive, military presence mostly has negative traits. The example of Varosha, a 
large abandoned neighborhood in Famagusta, shows how some areas are being kept. During 
the 1974 invasion, the Greek residents of Varosha had to flee from their homes, barely taking 
possessions, and thinking they would return fast, but they haven’t returned since. The entrances 
to this neighborhood are guarded by soldiers, and it still stands in Famagusta completely aban-
doned for more than four decades. In contradiction to this, a different impression of the Turk-
ish troops is offered at the Naval Martyrs monument in Kyrenia harbor. The neatly furnished 
monument park displays a panel, whose text praises the fallen soldiers and naval personnel of 
the 1974 invasion as martyrs and interprets the invasion as the Cyprus Peace Operation. Greek 
Cypriots consider the same soldiers as aggressors. Considering the two views on this historical 
event, the impression of too long military presence in the Turkish part for a ‘peace operation’ 
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seems hard to avoid.  
 The matter of cultural goods – their status, preservation, and presentation, is much af-
fected by the events of the past, by nationalism, and by military presence. The TRNC entity of-
fers and uses some bigger cultural goods like castles and ancient sites to promote its tourism, but 
most of them nevertheless require better care. The Orthodox Christian churches suffered the 
most. While there are some rare exceptions of well preserved churches in the north, for exam-
ple the Agios Mamas church in Morphou which is now a museum, most of these churches and 
monasteries lived the fate of becoming abandoned, devastated, vandalized, and time took its 
toll on them. Some of these are the Panagia Absinthiostissa monastery located north of Nicosia, 
and the early Christian church Panagia tis Kyras which is situated in an abandoned field near 
the village Sazlikoy in Karpas peninsula, Livadia district. The valuable small 12th century church 
is possibly one of the oldest preserved churches on the island, but it lies in a field closed with a 
fence, completely forgotten and left to decay. However, one of the most devastated churches and 
monasteries which can be seen in the whole TRNC are located near the small village of Zyamet 
on Karpas peninsula, and in Famagusta’s old town. The condition of most Orthodox churches 
and monasteries represents the entity’s attitude towards treating old heritage for being of Greek 
origin, whereas compared to the western standards, the ones with important historical signif-
icance would likely be at least basically maintained. Some of the mentioned sacral objects are 
situated in the proximity of well-maintained mosques. An additional observation on the state 
of these religious places, along with some former Greek properties and homes, shows that the 
buildings were left to the influence of time, but were never completely torn down, probably for 
the purpose to remind of past events and the division. Hopefully the matters of neglected cul-
tural heritage in the north parts of Cyprus will receive more attention when a solid solution to 
the Cyprus dispute gets achieved.
CONCLUSION
 An insight into the politics of memory in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 
especially in cases of direct contact like the author experienced, leads to the impression that a 
strong feeling of national proudness is beyond doubt emphasized through strong ethno-sym-
bolism. For the Turkish Cypriots, it is very important to show the world how they are Turkish. 
They show it the way they chose, through flags, Atatürk, and military presence. The method is 
possibly such because of the unrecognized status of the TRNC political entity. Nationalism also 
reveals what this entity perceives as important to collectively remember. That would be the 1974 
Cyprus Peace Operation to which the Naval Martyr’s monument in Kyrenia is dedicated to, the 
self-proclamation of the TRNC in 1983, in short, the happenings of the recent past. What is in-
teresting about this choice of collective remembrance is the fact that the Turkish side of the con-
flict didn’t emphasize the whole Turkish history on the island starting from 1571, thus not opt-
ing for the same primordial strategy as the Greek side which constantly highlights the antique 
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colonization. In authors opinion, the present-day politics of memory in the TRNC relies heavily 
on the 20’th century events, and less on the older past. As for the cultural heritage status, many 
improvements could be made if the politics of memory wouldn’t focus so much on nationalism 
and provocation, as well as on politics of forgetfulness and ignorance in the case of devastated 
Greek Orthodox heritage. Overall, the author is certain that the experience a visitor could come 
across in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is unique and historically interesting. 
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